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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COLE v. RICHARDSONANOTHER LOOK AT STATE LOYALTY OATHS

On September
sociologist at the
Mrs. Richardson
public employees

30, 1968, Lucretia Richardson was hired as a research
Boston State Hospital. After six weeks of employment
was asked to subscribe to the oath required of all
in Massachusetts.' The oath in part is as follows:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence
or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.2

Mrs. Richardson informed the personnel department of the hospital that
she would not take the oath as ordered because of her belief that it
was in violation of the United States Constitution. Approximately 10 days
later Dr. Jonathan Cole, the superintendent of the hospital, personally informed Mrs. Richardson that, unless she subscribed to the oath, she could
not continue as an employee of the Boston State Hospital. Again she refused and her employment was terminated on November 25, 1968. In
March, 1969, Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint in the United States Dis1. During belated employment processing on November 15, 1968, Ms. Brady,
principal clerk of the personnel department at Boston State Hospital, advised
plaintiff that she was required by statute to subscribe to the provisions of the oath
required by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (1970).
2. The full text of the two relevant statutes is as follows; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (1970): "Every person entering the employ of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, before entering upon the discharge of his
duties, shall take and subscribe to, under the pains and penalty of perjury, the following oath or affirmation:"'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution
of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the Government of the
United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method.'
"Such oath or affirmation shall be filed by the subscriber, if he shall be employed by the state, with the secretary of the commonwealth, if an employee of a
county, with the county commissioners, and if an employee of a city or town, with
the city clerk or the town clerk, as the case may be.
"The oath or affirmation prescribed by this section shall not be required of any
person who is employed by the commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof as
a physician or nurse in a hospital or other health care institution and is a citizen
of a foreign country."
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trict Court of Massachusetts. The district court declared the oath unconstitutional and enjoined the appellants from applying the statute to Mrs.
Richardson. 3 However, on appeal the United States Supreme Court
deemed the oath constitutionally permissible. Cole v. Richardson, 405
U.S. 676 (1972).
The Massachusetts loyalty oath case is the most recent addition to a
series of Supreme Court evaluations of loyalty oaths originating in Arizona,
New York and Maryland. 4 Although these three oaths had been rejected on constitutional grounds, the Massachusetts oath was upheld. It
appears, therefore, that the question of whether a loyalty oath imposed
by a state is in violation of first amendment rights has been re-evaluated
by the Supreme Court. The purposes of this note are: first, to examine
the impact of the Richardson decision on the American populus; second,
to trace the constitutional history of the loyalty oath; and third, to evaluate the change in direction that Richardson indicates.
Loyalty qualifications for employment have taken two main forms.
One form is the loyalty program, in which numerous and varied loyalty
qualifications are prescribed and an investigation is made to determine if
the employee meets the specified requirements. The Richardson case
deals with the second form, the loyalty oath, in which the prospective employee swears or affirms that he or she is not disqualified on various
grounds. The issue of loyalty oaths in the United States today is one
which touches the lives of millions of Americans. The latest available
statistics show that there are approximately 3,000,000 federal government
employees, all of whom have been subjected to loyalty oaths. Not included
in this figure are about two-thirds of the 9,000,000 state and local government employees, who also are required to take loyalty oaths as a condition precedent to employment. Further, about 5,000,000 non-government employees are under federal loyalty programs and consequently
must abide by their conditions. Thus, 14,000,000 Americans out of a
total working force that approximates 70,000,000, or one in five, are
3. Richardson v. Cole, 300 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Mass. 1969). Upon her refusal, based on the assertion that the oath was unconstitutional, she was paid for
her services and told no further compensation could be made. She then brought
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 requesting the appointment of a three judge district
court and a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality. The district court
upheld the "uphold and defend" clause, the first part of the oath, based on
Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 36
(1968). But it found that the "oppose the overthrow" clause was fatally vague
and unspecific and therefore in violation of the Constitution.
4. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
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directly affected by loyalty oaths in the United States.' The potential
impact upon freedom of expression can scarcely be exaggerated. Thus,
it is imperative to determine what loyalty qualifications are compatible
with the right to freedom of expression. Further, it is imperative to determine what rules of law governing loyalty oaths can reach the often
elusive middle ground that will insure protection of state functions as
well as full protection of individual first amendment rights. The issue in
the Richardson decision turns upon qualifications for employment
that are affected by beliefs, associations and opinions of the potential
employee and as such can be labeled "expression." The case is restricted
and defined by these limits and does not extend to action or activity. 6
The majority in Richardson stated that a loyalty oath may not in5. R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY ch. 6 (1958). See generally Asper, The
Long and Unhappy History of Loyalty Testing in Maryland, 13 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 97, 104 (1969); Jahoda and Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of
Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs,
61 YALE L.J. 295 (1952); Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW

AND CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963); Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739 (1968).
6. The potential implications and ramifications of a case such as Richardson
can be extended beyond the issue of first amendment rights to encompass the
matters of bill of attainder and due process of law. Both of these issues were
presented to the Court in Richardson.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act directed against a designated person without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. The plaintiff,
Richardson argued that MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (1970), subjected her
to loss of her employment position without the requisite judicial procedure. The bill
of attainder clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, was implemented to ensure separation of powers among the three branches of government by guarding against the legislative exercise of judicial power, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), but
the Court rejected the argument.
In Cummings v. Missouri, 76 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1866), the Supreme Court
renounced as an attainder the test oath provision contained in Article II of the
Missouri Constitution of 1865, which required that every voter should execute an
oath that he had never given aid to alien enemies. Further, if any person had not
complied with the requirements, then he was forbidden to vote, hold office, practice
law, preach, teach or solemnize marriages. The Supreme Court in Cummings
struck down a legislative enactment that would, in effect, deprive a citizen of the
ordinary safeguards to insure administration of justice by the established judicial
tribunals. See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554
(1940).
The majority opinion in Richardson dealt briefly with the allegation of denial of
due process: "The purpose of the oath is clear on its face. We cannot presume
that the Massachusetts legislature intended by its use of such general terms as
'uphold,' 'defend' and 'oppose' to impose obligations of specific, positive action by
oath takers. Any such construction would raise questions whether the oath was so
vague as to amount to a denial of due process." 405 U.S. at 685-86. See also
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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fringe upon rights guaranteed by the first amendment because of the political beliefs of the individual, as determined by the Court in Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona.7 The petitioner in Baird, who had recently passed
the Arizona bar examination, was refused admission to the bar because
she refused to respond to a question as to whether she was a member of
the Communist Party or any organization "that advocates overthrow of the
United States Government by force or violence."' 8 The Supreme Court in
Baird, through the decision of Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and
Marshall, concluded that such views and beliefs of an applicant are immune
from inquisition by a bar committee. The Baird Court held:
The First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a
person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a
particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. 9

In a manner reminiscent of Baird, the majority in Richardson states
emphatically that
employment [may not] be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or
will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following: criticizing the
institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government. ....
10
Chief Justice Burger agreed with and extended the majority opinion
analysis to the extent that "the oaths under consideration often required
individuals to reach back into their pasts to recall minor, sometimes innocent, activities.""
Here the first amendment right was not to be preempted. However, the majority distinguished Richardson from the cases

that had preceded based on the following reasoning.

The Richardson

Court stated that "[s]everal cases recently decided by the Court stand out

among our oath cases because they have upheld the constitutionality of

oaths, addressed to the future, promising constitutional support in broad
terms."'1

2

Thus, the majority in Richardson cited the decision of Bond v.
to establish the new standard of constitutional validity.
In
Bond, state legislators were required by a Georgia statute to swear to
13

Floyd

7. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
Question No. 27
on the Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit on the Application to be Admitted
to the Arizona Bar read: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party or any organization that advocates overthrow of the United States
Government by force or violence?" See ARIZONA SUPREME COURT RULE 28(c).
Accord, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
8. 401 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1971).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972).
11. Id. at 681.
12. Id.
13. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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support the constitution of the state and of the United States. 14 The Court
held that the Georgia oath called only for an acknowledgement of a willingness to abide by "constitutional processes of government.' u 5 The
Court concluded that the first amendment did not undercut the validity
of the constitutional oath provisions. The Richardson majority contrasted
the Baird and Bond cases in order to define specifically what loyalty
oath would be constitutionally acceptable. The Richardson Court in its
conclusion stated that "[s]ince there is no constitutionally protected right
to overthrow a government by force, violence, or illegal or unconstitutional means, no constitutional right is infringed by an oath to abide
by the constitutional system in the future."' 16
The majority in Richardson relies upon the dissenting opinion of
Justice Marshall in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond.17 In that case Justice Marshall stated: "The oath of constitutional
support requires an individual assuming public responsibilities to affirm
. . . that he will endeavor to perform his public duties lawfully.' u 8 It may
be questioned, however, if simple affirmation of an oath is adequate assurance that an employee will "perform his public duties lawfully."' 9 The
Richardson majority apparently accepts the loyalty oath as adequate assurance of loyalty to the state.
The majority decision in Richardson distinguishes a chain of evolutionary decisions in the past two decades of Supreme Court rule regarding loyalty oaths. During that period an awareness of individual rights
had come to balance the interest of the state. Prior to this recognition of
individual rights the state interest had been diligently protected by a post
World War II Court that reflected the mood of a country seeking to control subversive activity. The majority decision in Richardson is best
understood by an analysis of the Supreme Court decisions of Bailey v.
Richardson,20 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 1 and
22
Adler v. Board of Education.
14. Id. at 135.
15. Id. See also Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961);

Ohlson v. Phillips, 397 U.S. 317 (1970).
16. 405 U.S. 676, 686 (1972).
17.
(1970).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154

id. at 192.
Id.
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aII'd mem., 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
341 U.S. 716 (1951).
342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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State discretion in the choice of employees based on loyalty oaths
emanates from such early cases as Bailey v. Richardson,28 where a
state employee was discharged from her position because "reasonable
grounds exist[ed] for belief that [she was] disloyal to the Government of
the United States."' 24 The Bailey court determined that there is no prohibition against the dismissal of government employees because of their political beliefs, activities or affiliations. 25 The discretion of the government in choosing employees was considered to be analogous to the discretion of a private employer. 26 Consequently, the employee was discharged from her position for the beliefs and affiliations that she held.
The government as employer was again favored in Garner v. Board
of Public Works of Los Angeles 27 where every employee of the city was
required to take an oath that he had not "advised, advocated or taught,
the overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful means of the Government.... ",28 The Garner Court held that the oath was valid as a "reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and to the United States."'2 9
Such an oath of allegiance places the burden and consequences upon the
potential employee to determine if he is within the ill-defined boundaries.
Commenting on this dilemma, Justice Frankfurter posed a question that reflects the difficulty in applying a loyalty oath to an employment spectrum that is marked by extreme mobility and fluidity: "How can anyone
be sure that an organization with which he affiliates will not at some time
in the future be found by a State or National official to advocate overthrow
of the government by 'unlawful means?' "30
Justices Black and Douglas voiced dissent in Garner that evolved into
a twenty year majority rule: "Petitioners were disqualified from office
• . .not because of any program they currently espouse. .

. They are

23. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd mem., 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
24. 182 F.2d at 61. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Peters v.
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
25. 182 F.2d at 59.
26. Id. at 60. Compare Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd mem., 341 U.S. 918 (1951), with United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
27. 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1950).
Accord, Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
28. 341 U.S. at 719.
29. Id. at 720-21.
30. Id. at 728.
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deprived of their livelihood by legislative act, not by judicial processes." '
Justice Black again dissented in Adler v. Board of Education,3 2 a case
that tested the Feinberg Law of New York. The statute provided that no
member of an organization advocating the unlawful overthrow of the government could be eligible for employment. Adler was pivotal in introducing the issue of individual first amendment protection. Justice Black
stated in dissent that "public officials cannot be constitutionally vested
with powers to select the ideas people can think about, censor the public
views they can express, or choose the persons or groups people can asso33
ciate with."1

Notwithstanding the rejection of loyalty oaths that was initiated by the
dissents in Garner and Adler, the Richardson majority elected to revert to

the majority reasoning in Bailey and Garner. Justice Douglas dissenting
in Richardson as he had in Garner, directly attacked the majority in its
definition of overthrow: "[a]dvocacy of basic fundamental changes in
government . . . is within the protection of the First Amendment even
when it is restrictively construed. ' 3 4 The Richardson majority has rejected

this premise by claiming that if a state elicits a promise to abide by a
state or federal constitution in the future, then no suppression of first
amendment rights has occurred. Thus, the wording of the statute in question will determine its validity, dependent upon the negative or positive
inference that it elicits.
In Lerner v. Casey,3 5 a case subsequent to Adler, a subway conductor
31. Id. at 735-36. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,
76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 710-11 (1963); Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 156,
138 P.2d 272, 273 (1943); State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 1115, 182 S.W.2d 46,
54 (1944).
32. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). The Adler Court in 1951 claimed a person could be
denied employment because of membership in a listed organization without violating
his right to free speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between membership
in a listed organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but
not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is
inherent in every choice.
The limitation on loyalty oaths noted by the Court in Garner and Adler resulted
in the invalidation of an Oklahoma loyalty oath in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952). The oath required employees of the state to swear they had not
in the last five years been members of any organization seeking violent overthrow
of the government. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the oath unconstitutional as disqualifying persons "solely on the basis of organizational membership."
The United States Supreme Court upheld that decision.
33. 342 U.S. at 497. The dissents in Garner and Adler are important in that
the arguments offered evolved to become the majority opinion for the next two
decades.
34. 405 U.S. 676, 688 (1972).
35. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
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in New York City refused to tell the City Commissioner of Investigation
if he was a member of the Communist Party. He was discharged from
his position under the New York Security Risk Law. The Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal based upon "untrustworthiness" and "unreliability," refusing to consider the question of a first amendment violation. 88
In his dissent Justice Douglas reiterated his argument of first amendment
rights which he had initiated in Adler. Justice Douglas claimed:
The fitness of a subway conductor for his job depends on his health, his promptness, his record for reliability, not on his politics or his philosophy of life. The fitness of a teacher for her job turns on her devotion to that priesthood, her education, and her performance in . . . the classroom, not on her political beliefs. Anyone who plots against the government and moves in treasonable opposition to it
can be punished. Government rightly can concern itself with the actions of people.
But it's time we called a halt to government penalizing people for their beliefs.
To repeat, individuals and private groups can make any judgment they want. But
the realm of belief-as opposed to action-is one which the First Amendment
37
places beyond the long arms of government.

One should note especially, in these remarks by Justice Douglas, the distinction made between belief and action, and the effect of that distinction on first amendment rights. In Lerner, as in Richardson, the only
conduct of the petitioner under consideration by the Court were beliefs
as opposed to actions.
It became apparent, as various loyalty oaths were reviewed by the
Supreme Court, that specific guide lines had to be drawn to articulate
the grounds for disqualification from an employment position. The Court
sought in cases such as Cole v. Young,38 United States v. Robel3 9 and
Schneider v. Smith40 to implement such guide lines for the determination of
what would constitute grounds for disqualification. In addressing itself
to the dilemma, the Court, through Chief Justice Warren in Robel and Justice Fortas in Schneider, stated that it would be constitutionally permissible
to establish and maintain a restrictive employment program if it were
based on precise standards. The opinion of Chief Justice Warren in
Robel determined the factors which had to be present for discharge:
36. Id. at 472.
37. The dissent of Justice Douglas was written in conjunction with another first
amendment case, Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), and appears
at 357 U.S. 415-16. The Beilan and Lerner cases were reaffirmed in Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960), as to a temporary employee. But the
Court divided four to four in the same case on similar issues involving a permanent
employee. Chief Justice Warren took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
38. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
39. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

40. 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
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(1) active membership; (2) specific intent to further the unlawful goals
of the organization; and (3) that the employee holds a sensitive position.41

The requirements of active membership and specific intent to further
the illegal activity of the organization had been firmly established by the
Court in the middle and late 1960's. In Elfbrandt v. Russell 42 Justice
Douglas explained the purpose for such requirements:
[Tihose who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who
do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens
or as public employees. Laws such as this which are not restricted in scope to
those who join with the "specific intent" to further illegal action impose, in effect,
a conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organi43
zation.

In recognition of such decisions 44 the majority in Richardson stated
that
employment may not be conditioned on an oath denying past, or abjuring future,
associational activities within constitutional protection; such protected activities
include membership in organizations having illegal purposes unless one knows of the
45
purpose and shares a specific intent to promote the illegal purpose.

Therefore, "mere" membership without specific intent 40 to further the illegal aims of the organization is not enough to allow an employee to be
discharged from a position.
The third criterion established by the Court in Robel has been the most
difficult in its interpretation and application. What is a sensitive employment position? It has become readily apparent that the potential for
41.

389 U.S. 258, 261, 266 (1967).

42. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
See James v. Gilmore, 389 U.S. 572 (1968), in
which the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam a decision of a three judge court holding invalid, based on Elfbrandt, a Texas loyalty oath. In addition, state loyalty
oaths have been invalidated by lower federal courts or state courts in California,
Colorado, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Ehrenreich v. Londerholm, 273
F. Supp. 178 (D. Kan. 1967); Gallagher v. Smiley, 270 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo.
1967); Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 434
P.2d 961 (1967); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 62, 228 A.2d 165 (1967); Brush
v. State Board of Higher Education, 245 Ore. 373, 422 P.2d 268 (1966).
43. 384 U.S. at 17.
44. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court has consistently rejected disclaimer
oaths that did not reach the standard tied to "force and violence." This criterion
set by the Court is limited to the advocacy and discipline as described in Keyishian
in which the fine line of distinction between expression is transcended into the
realm of activity.
45. 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972) (emphasis added).
46. Membership and specific intent are the first two requisites necessary
under the Robel criteria to refuse employment to a potential employee based on
a loyalty test.
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subversive and disruptive influence certainly varies from one state
position to another. The ability to reach the public mentality is certainly
greater as a teacher than as a public service maintenance employee. A
state employment position that could be readily used to espouse subversive ideology is one "sensitive" to the protection of the government security and thus a more critical examination should be made of a prospective employee to fill that position. 47 The scale and volume of loyalty
programs today 48 has made it increasingly apparent, however, that the rulings in determination of a sensitive and non-sensitive position were not
considered in Richardson. The difficulty is the determination of where
the line of distinction should be drawn between a sensitive and non-sensitive position. In Cole v. Young 9 as well as Robel the Court emphatically
stated the necessity of a distinction between a sensitive and non-sensitive
position. However, the application of such standard is difficult. Employee
positions and job titles do not always lend themselves to simple classification as exclusively sensitive or non-sensitive. For example, because appellee Richardson held the position of research sociologist, the simplistic
dichotomy "sensitive or non-sensitive" deteriorates. It may be generally agreed that a research analyst is one with minimal public contact, and consequently less potential for influence. Conversely, by definition, a sociologist is one who is constantly engaged in the study of human social structures and relations and thus has tremendous potential
for influence through such a position. 50 Now where is that line of distinction to be drawn? The difficulty in the application of the "sensitive position" test (Robel criterion number three) is not limited to the Richardson
case but includes many employment positions today. The lines so carefully and rationally drawn in 1967 have been discarded five years later
in the Richardson decision presumably because of the difficulty in the application of such a standard. In Richardson, how it could be proven by
mere failure to comply with a loyalty oath that Mrs. Richardson was an
active member in any subversive organization, had the specific intent
to further the unlawful goals of that organization, and held a sensitive
position, is difficult to ascertain.
Central to the dilemma the loyalty oath presents is that the interest
to be protected is not one-dimensional. Both the interests of the state
and that of the individual are of consequence and deserve to be protected. At least three different state interests are commonly advanced
47.

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

48.

BROWN, supra note 5.

49.
50.

351 U.S. 536 (1956).
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1226 (1969).
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to justify disqualification of individuals from public employment positions.
Included in this list are those: (1) who present a potential for sabotage
or other activity directly injurious to national security; (2) who are untrustworthy or incompetent in the performance of their duties; and (3)
who simply oppose the basic principles on which the government was
founded. 51 The Court has defended the state interest in preventing the
misuse of office as an appropriate basis for imposing loyalty restrictions on
teachers5 2 and lawyers. 53 However, this reasoning is limited. Again,
the sensitive versus non-sensitive position argument is important. The
vast majority of job tifles do not allow the employee sufficient discretion
to permit any significant manipulation to benefit the organization. Thus,
the effect upon the state interest is negligible. Vagueness permeates the
Richardson decision which states in conclusion that a loyalty oath does
not infringe unnecessarily on protected interests of the individual. 54 The
Court never clearly defined the "state interest" of which the infringement
upon the first amendment right was deemed "necessary." 5 5 The Court
may have been in agreement in realizing that the state has an interest in
denying support to "disloyal" persons, but unless the statute is sufficiently
related to that state interest, it must be denied. This balancing of interest requirement was recognized by Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Scales v. United States.5" He stated "a . . . blanket prohibition of
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, [would pose]
a real danger that legitimate political expression or association
would be impaired. . . ,,15 Thus, the legitimate and necessary power
of the state to inquire into the lives of potential employees must be limited. Such probing inquiry poses a significant threat to the individual's
freedom of expression. Justice Stewart for the majority in Shelton v.
Tucker5 8 introduced a requirement that only questions relevant to the spe51. Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath? 1966 Sup. CT.
REV. 193, 219.
52. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). Justice Minton

speaking for the majority claimed "[a] teacher works in a sensitive area in a
schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds toward the society in
which they live. In this the state has a vital concern."
53. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). See also
Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Ciu. L. REv.,
480 (1953).
54. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 686 (1972).
55. Israel, supra note 51, at 218.
56. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). See also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961).
57. 367 U.S. at 229.
58. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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cific position be asked of the employee. The Court realized that the
state's interest, although legitimate, could not be infinitely extended.
The argument presented as a justification for a governmental intrusion
into the beliefs of a potential employee is that such a process can eliminate in advance persons whose beliefs indicate that they are likely to cause
harm in the future. The question presented is whether the first amendment precludes such preventive regulation.5 9 Justice Jackson in American CommunicationsAssociation v. Douds6° stated that
I know of no situation in which a citizen may incur civil or criminal liability or disability because a court infers an evil mental state where no act at all has occurred.
Our trial processes are clumsy and unsatisfying for inferring cogitations which are
incidental to actions, but they do not even pretend to ascertain the thought that has
had no outward manifestations. 6 1

Thus, what appears to be a mere requisite to comply with the "governmental process" in the future is in fact a suppression of the first amendment right to freedom of expression at the time the oath is administered.
It seems apparent by admission of the Richardson majority in upholding the loyalty oath that such a gesture is at best hollow. Chief Justice Burger stated:
The time may come when the value of oaths in routine public employment will be
thought not "worth the candle" for all the division of opinion they engender. However, while oaths are required by legislative acts it is not our function to evaluate
62
their wisdom or utility but only to decide whether they offend the Constitution.

It would seem that the central issue should not be the validity of the
loyalty oath but rather its very existence.
As stated previously, the state interest certainly merits protection, but
one may well ask whether the state loyalty oath affords such protection.
Without oversimplification of the issue, several objective factors should
be measured in selecting a state employee. First, what is the degree of
individual commitment to illegal goals of the organization to which the
potential employee may belong? Second, what is the nature of the position involved? Third, what are the employee's past attitudes toward
work? Fourth, what is the nature of the subversive activity?63 It may be
59.

T.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION 33

(1970).

60. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
61. American Communication Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 437 (1950).
Such activity could also be viewed as an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy as determined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Under the
provisions of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 15 (1970); violation of § 14 is also
punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisonment for
not more than one year or both.
62. 405 U.S. at 685 n.3.
63. Israel, supra note 51, at 245.
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generally accepted that these four factors must be considered and
weighed. However, a loyalty oath is not flexible enough to sufficiently
accomplish this objective.
[A]ssuming the state may utilize some form of loyalty test based upon certain
classes of speech and association to serve the legitimate interests of protecting internal security and insuring employee reliability, the loyalty oath is invalid because
64
it is a totally inappropriate means of serving those interests.

The subtle distinctions that can be so carefully drawn by a Court of
nine men can become misunderstood, misintended and finally discarded
when an attempt is made to apply them equitably to the ranks of
14,000,000 employees.
If the test is aimed at those who advocate violent overthrow of the government, the
investigators soon find themselves delving into questions of Marxism, Leninism,
Stalinism and other ideologies; into attitudes toward violence in the civil rights movement; into problems of civil disobedience; and beyond. If the standard forbids
membership in an organization, the questioning soon leads to matters of affiliation, front organizations, support to the organization, parallelism of ideas, and
beyond. Even if the person interrogated is finally found "qualified," word of the
interrogation spreads around and a depressing effect upon the individual can only
be detrimental. 65

It is difficult, if not impossible, to place limits upon the degree of loyalty
that is required of a potential employee. The difficulty is extended to
impossibility when a court attempts to set judicial boundaries upon such
an intangible as a loyalty requirement. This difficulty is best realized
by noting that the last two decades have in no way proven any relation
between loyalty oaths and the prevention or detection of subversive activity in the United States.6"
Seeking a definition of loyalty is a philosophical problem with endless
difficulties.6 7 The loyalty oath, like the sensationalism of the McCarthy
Era that created it, should be laid to rest.
The starting point is to reject the proposition that the government is entitled to
refuse employment to persons who are "disloyal" in the sense of being critical
of American institutions, and therefore do not deserve to share in the benefits of
government largess. For many people, loyalty oaths are built substantially on this
premise. But such a social interest . . . has no constitutional weight. To give
64. Id. at 247.
65. EMERSON, supra note 59, at 208.
66. See Jahoda and Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An
Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALE
L.J. 295 (1952).
67. H. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS (1959). See generally D. LACY, FREEDOM
AND COMMUNICATIONS (2d ed. 1965); H. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY (rev. ed.
1964); Reich, Making Free Speech Audible, THE NATION, Feb. 8, 1965, at 138.
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of the First Amendment.
it any effect would . . . violate the fundamental concept
68
• . . No Court has ever supported such a proposition.

The turmoil that surrounds the question of loyalty oaths is not recent.
Justice Jackson described in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette6 9 the protection afforded by the first amendment.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act to
70
their faith therein.

.The power of the state to safeguard the public services from disloyal and
subversive activity should not be questioned. The measures that define
disloyalty must allow public employees to know what is considered disloyal. A government policy that seeks to protect varied intellectual outlooks in the belief that the best views will prevail will insure both protection of the state interest and also safeguard first amendment rights.
Thomas Ahern

68. EMERSON, supra note 59, at 210.
69. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
70. Id. at 642.

